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Chapter 7
Derrida’s territorial knowledge of 
justice
William E. Conklin
Introduction
Peter Fitzpatrick’s writings prove once and for all that it is possible for a 
law professor to write in beautiful English. His work also proves once and 
for all that the dominating tradition of Anglo-American legal philosophy 
and of law teaching has been barking up the wrong tree: namely, that the 
philosopher and professional law teachers can understand justice as 
nested in empty forms, better known as rules, doctrines, principles, pol-
icies, and other standards. The more rigorous our analysis or decomposi-
tion of the forms, we have believed, the more closely do we access the 
identity of laws. Justice has been assumed to be a matter of intellectually 
accessing such analysed forms. Fitzpatrick’s articles and books embody an 
implicit critique of the analytic view of law and of justice. My entry point 
into this critique is his preoccupation with Jacques Derrida’s theory of laws 
as universals and with Derrida’s theory of justice as an inaccessible imme-
diacy or presence in context-specific or concrete experienced events. Each 
event is experienced in an official’s decision. Such a decision represents 
what Derrida, Fitzpatrick, and Hegel call ‘individuality’.
 Derrida’s theory of law presents a conundrum. Derrida misses the possi-
bility that law may exist by virtue of its content rather than its form. 
Derrida misses this possibility because, heavily influenced by Kant (in Der-
rida’s theory of law), Derrida associates law with universals. This is so 
because Kant (and Derrida) are preoccupied with the identity of what 
counts as a law (lois) rather than with a law’s legitimacy. A universal cannot 
exist unless it is legitimate, and it is legitimate, I claim, by virtue of its 
content. In his association of law with universals, Derrida presupposes that 
legal knowledge exists with reference to a territorial-like boundary. The 
forms are represented or signified by signs (signifiers) within a boundary 
of the ultimate form (the state, the nation, or humanity). This ultimate 
form as a universal, like the discrete rules or forms, lacks socially contin-
gent content. A boundary separates knowable universals from the unknow-
able world on the exteriority of the boundary. The unknowable world is 
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Derrida’s territorial knowledge of justice  103
constituted by concrete events experienced in context-specific circum-
stances. In his legal theory Derrida hones in upon the decision as the 
experienced event. In a decision, one is present or immediate with the 
event. Derrida considers such immediacy as justice. The immediacy, 
however, can only be represented as a sign (sometimes called a signifier). 
The sign, in turn, represents an empty signified or form, according to 
Derrida. Because the immediacy remains a representation rather than a 
presentation of the experienced event, laws as universals cannot be just. 
The rupture between the inaccessible immediacy of a decision on the one 
hand and the represented empty forms on the other is critical to Derrida’s 
theory of law.
 I claim that this rupture permeates Derrida’s writings about law because 
Derrida possesses a territorial-like sense of legal knowledge. I shall argue 
to this effect as follows. In the first section I shall explain the importance 
of Fitzpatrick’s exposure of the vacuity of the foundation of the system or 
structure of universals. In the second section I shall flesh out two elements 
of Derrida’s legal theory: law as form and the ipseity or concrete event that 
the form excludes from law. This takes me to the third section, where I 
shall elaborate how Derrida’s legal theory presupposes knowledge as terri-
torial. I shall argue in the final section that this very sense of territorial 
knowledge prevents justice from accessing law and law from accessing 
justice. I conclude with the hint of a very different sense of law, one that 
draws from experiential knowledge in contradistinction to territorial 
knowledge.
The vacuous foundation of law
Permit me to turn to Fitzpatrick’s work as my entry point into Derrida’s 
theory of law. When Fitzpatrick seeks the foundation of law in various con-
texts, including judgments in Canada and Australia, access to justice, and 
post-colonial thought, he invariably exposes the foundation as nothing-
ness. A foundation must radically differ from the ordinary forms as laws. If 
the foundation were an ordinary analysable unit or form, there would be 
no finality in the trace of one unit to another in search of a foundation. 
So, the foundation, being knowable and yet external to laws as forms, is a 
mere form without particular content. As Fitzpatrick puts it, the founda-
tion is ‘empty’, ‘vacuous’, ‘nothingness’, ‘beleaguered’ (2002: 242; 2005: 
9–13; 2008a). Relying heavily upon Derrida’s ‘Force of law’ (1990), Fitz-
patrick emphasizes that the foundation has a mystical character, in that 
language (the signifier/signified relation) cannot access it. This mysticism 
colours the foundation despite the rationalist pretensions of the profes-
sional knowers and despite the rhetoric of the rule of law.
 I have described the foundation as invisible because of its inaccessibility 
to legal language.1 This inacessibility of the foundation has led, ironically, 
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104  W. E. Conklin
to its construction by legal officials and philosophers. We officials and ped-
agogues have done so by decomposing concepts into their features or ele-
ments on faith that by doing so we would access laws and justice. We have 
ironically done so in the name of the foundation. Because of this self- 
generating character of the system of forms and concepts, and because of 
the need for an externality to the analysis of forms, the ultimate form is 
not decomposable into further units. The state fulfils this quest for a final-
ity to the analysis of forms.
 Because of the emptiness of the ultimate form of the system of legal 
units, legal philosophers end up concealing the vacuous foundation of law 
as they analyse theories about the discrete analysable units. Fitzpatrick 
offers several contexts where such concealment permeates judicial reason-
ing. In the first context he quotes Kant’s oft-forgotten assertion (oft- 
forgotten even in contemporary readings about ethics and political 
philosophy) that it is treasonous to question the foundation of the modern 
legal order (Fitzpatrick 2003b: 436, quoting Kant 1797/1996: 95; see also 
Fitzpatrick 2006b: 167, 175, 183). In a second context he recalls how the 
universal truth embedded in law was relied upon by European states in the 
process of colonizing much of the globe (see, for example, Fitzpatrick 
2002: 242). In a third context the impact of the vacuity of the foundation 
of the system of legal units upon Anglo-American analytical jurisprudence 
is exposed. Law has been associated with an autonomous system of rules 
or a coherent narrative structure, both of which are said to depart from 
the behaviour and the beliefs that a founding rule or a background struc-
ture of conceptions represent. Once we are left with the autonomous 
system of rules or principles, there remains a forgotten ‘sub-standard, 
abnormal case containing within it the threat that the legal system will dis-
solve’ (Hart 1994: 123; Hart’s original 1961 edition quoted in Fitzpatrick 
1992: 210). In a fourth context, to be discussed later in the chapter as 
‘being with’, the foundation of law is sometimes associated with social 
bonding. This concern with social bonding as the legitimizing source of 
the system of rules is also forgotten once officials begin to analyse the 
chains of rules. Finally, Fitzpatrick turns to the impact of the vacuity of the 
foundation to international law. Given the vacuity of the state’s legitimacy 
and given that the state is the primary legal person of international law, 
the legal official needs to address the mystical foundation of the state’s 
domestic legal order before that official can sustain the existence of inter-
national law (Fitzpatrick 2003b).
 Against the above contexts, law is self-posited and self-determined 
(Fitzpatrick 2004: 122). The structure of concepts dissolves into the 
power of state officials. The rule of law becomes a mere rhetorical device 
to sustain the power of lawyers and judges. The critical aspect of this is 
that because the concepts themselves are not accessible – always being 
deferred by the trace of one sign, which represents a signified concept to 
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another representing sign – the power of officials is entangled with their 
knowledge of legal language. Since professional law schools introduce 
and protect that language, professional legal education is instrumental 
in sustaining the power relations of society (see further Conklin 1993, 
1998). And legal education does so in the name of the law and access to 
justice. The consequence is that the foundation is actually constructed 
by officials as they search for more rigorous lower-levelled forms or con-
cepts in the metaphysical objectivity of higher-ordered forms. The foun-
dation is effectively constructed inside, not outside, the structure of 
forms as officials aspire to access legal objectivity.
 This is the point where Fitzpatrick’s work impacts upon the analytic 
methodology of contemporary jurisprudence, legal teaching materials, 
and scholarship about the law. What so many contemporary jurisprudes 
describe as the ‘existence conditions’ of the legal order – the social facts, 
the law beyond law, the state of nature, the General Will, the People, the 
Grundnorm – is a myth. In contemporary analytic parlance, concepts are 
valid if they are reasons for action by officials of the state. The gist of Fitz-
patrick’s originality might be framed in the language of analytical jurispru-
dence as follows. The ‘existence conditions’ of a legal order can be put to 
the side as not binding reasons for action. Fitzpatrick insists that the philo-
sopher just cannot separate the particular rules of a legal order from the 
existence conditions that the self-generating and self-defining Recht 
excludes. Further, when one traces a reason for action to another reason 
for action, one ultimately recognizes that the existence conditions of the 
legal order are nested in the power relations of state officials. The con-
sequence is that legal forms, so much a part of contemporary legal educa-
tion in professional law schools, ultimately depend upon the self-defining 
law itself. Again, the ultimate foundation of law is what Fitzpatrick 
describes as ‘vacuous’, ‘empty’, and a ‘layered irony’. The self-defining 
system of rules and institutions is thereby violently imposed upon inhabit-
ants in the name of the rule of law and objectivity. Fitzpatrick draws from 
Žižek’s reading of Kant to the effect that the origins of the legitimate 
order are ‘lawless origins’ that are cancelled by the historico-empirical cir-
cumstances that generate the legal order (Žižek 1991: 205). An explana-
tion of the origins of the legal order ‘a priori puts us outside’. The myth 
and mysticism of the origins remain a secret so long as contemporary legal 
theorists, law teachers, and other officials colour their analyses as the rule 
of law and objectivity. The secrecy is reinforced by disparaging rhetoric 
directed towards anyone, whether inside or outside the chains of analysed 
forms, who attempts to pierce the veil of the invisible foundation. Social 
bonding among the non-expert knowers of legal forms remains an outside 
possibility. The very existence of conditions of law – the ‘social facts’, ‘the 
People’ and the like – only depends upon the officials of the territorial 
state and the power relations internal to the state.
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106  W. E. Conklin
 Contemporary Anglo-American legal philosophy, so much a part of and 
dependent upon the dominance of a state-centred legal order, misses law’s 
inward self-determined and metaphysical construction of the foundation. 
The quest for the origin of laws in an external source, such as the social 
facts or a perfect coherent narrative, sustains legal philosophy in an air of 
naivety and denial. As Hart (1994) described from time to time, he was 
‘haunted’ by the prospect that the existence conditions of the legal order 
were nested in a social bonding that the analysis of concepts could not 
access. Such conditions, he admitted, were unrecognized and unrecogniz-
able because they were exterior to the self-conscious writing of the officials 
of the state. They were ‘unstated’, prior to the writing of officials. And yet, 
even that prospect of unstated unrecognized social behaviour remained 
excluded from legal philosophy. What mattered was power:
[O]nly officials might accept and use the system’s criteria of validity. 
The society in which this was so might be deplorably sheeplike; the 
sheep might end in the slaughter-house. But there is little reason for 
thinking that it could not exist or for denying it the title of a legal 
system.
(Hart 1994: 117)
But an inquiry beyond the positing and analysis of the elements of a form 
or concept of recognition or an intellectually coherent narrative in an 
effort to decompose concepts as reasons for action would amount to 
‘naïve’ beliefs and ‘emotion rather than truth’, as Matthew Kramer puts it, 
‘folk theories’, ‘half-baked’, ‘intuition-mongering’, and ‘psychological 
facts’, as Brian Leiter expresses it, or, as Hart asserts, a ‘nightmare’ that 
incidentally ‘haunts’ legal philosophy.2
 The consequence of the vacuity of the foundation, then, is that power 
determines law’s own legitimacy. Thrasymachus has won out over Soc rates’ 
inward voice of inquiry. Fitzpatrick (2006a) examines the ultimate power 
relations at the foundation of the modern legal order in several contexts. 
The most obvious one today is the imperial quest of the United States. 
Another is the failure of international lawyers to address the sovereign’s 
mystical foundation, a mysticism that legitimizes the primary legal persons 
of international law (Fitzpatrick 2003b). Perhaps the most consistent 
context of his exposure of the vacuous foundation is his examination of 
the power of European states as they imposed their concepts upon Aus-
tralian, African, and North American indigenous inhabitants (Fitzpatrick 
1990, 1998, 2001b, 2002, 2008a; Mostert and Fitzpatrick 2004). The signs 
(or words if we use the latter metaphorically) represent such forms, and 
such sign/signified relations constitute a language. The language is 
violent. Raw power and violence, not the rule of law, explain the imposi-
tion of forms upon indigenous social life precisely because the origin of 
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Derrida’s territorial knowledge of justice  107
the rule of law rests in vacuity. For Fitzpatrick, Derrida’s theory of law 
offers an important explanation as to why this is so.
 Fitzpatrick’s argument goes like this. When X resists Y, Y’s integrity is 
elevated at the very moment that Y is diminished and parasitic upon X 
(2008b: xi). In order to maintain its determinacy, law, as form, must 
respond to, as well as resist, the diminished and parasitic exteriority of the 
structure of forms. The latter privileging of the supplemental alien-ness 
poses an ironic twist. For, although law must resist the individual event, 
law must also respond to the latter in order for law to be determinate. As a 
consequence, law, to be law, requires a relation between the indeterminate 
form on the one hand and the determinate particularity on the other. The 
one cannot exist without the other, and yet the identity of each must 
remain autonomous of the other. The indeterminacy of pre-legality is 
‘always’ on the other side of the divide. And yet, law needs content – its 
forms being universal – and this, in turn, requires that law respond to the 
particularities of the indeterminate pre-legality. Pre-legality is indetermi-
nate because legal language, which represents analysed forms, cannot 
access the non-cognitive determinate experiences. In order to be determi-
nate, law must ‘extend beyond, exceed’, or respond to what is determinate 
in a judicial or legislative decision for the time being (ibid.: 440). This 
responsive relation would lack the character of the ‘violent word’ or lan-
guage which is otherwise superimposed upon the concrete, context- 
specific experiences. The universal forms are superimposed upon the 
stranger as the voice of such experiences (Fitzpatrick 2001d: 145–6).
Derrida’s sense of law
Now I shall take up the relation of universal forms to the individual pres-
ence of a particular experiential event, an event that Derrida claims is 
inaccessible to the forms. This response of the forms to the experienced 
event, described by Derrida as a decision, faces a formidable problem, 
namely that so long as we presuppose what I shall call a territorial sense of 
knowledge, instead of an experiential knowledge, there is an untranslata-
ble rupture between our legal knowledge of universals on the one hand 
and the immediacy or presence of the identity of utterer and decision on 
the other. This rupture between territorial knowledge and the outside and 
pre-existing experiential world raises this prospect: law’s response to its 
antithetical other does not and cannot bring closure to the determinacy of 
law. This is so because law’s response occurs through the configurations of 
signs with which officials and philosophers are familiar precisely because 
they are situated in the legal space on the territorial side of the rupture. 
The best that we can do is picture (or imagine) the identity of the stranger 
on the other side of the territorial boundary, which defines the outer limit 
of our knowledge of universals. The best that we can do is translate such 
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108  W. E. Conklin
an imagined identity into our own familiar language. Derrida especially 
emphasizes this inevitable need to translate the voice of the stranger into 
our own language. Again, Derrida understands language as the configura-
tion of the interrelations of signifiers (see Derrida 1985). The con-
sequence is that there is always an extra-ordinary or inaccessible remainder 
to legal language. Even the rupture between universals and the individual-
ity of a decision cannot be reconciled within the paradigm of legal know-
ledge, which Derrida takes for granted. Let us gain a closer understanding 
of Derrida’s theory of law in order to appreciate the presupposed rupture 
that contains law. First, what does Derrida signify by ‘law’? Second, what 
does Derrida signify by ‘individuality’?
Law as form
Derrida takes for granted that law is composed of a system of content- 
independent forms. It is important in this respect that although Derrida 
did write about Hegel’s logic, Derrida takes Kant for his understanding of 
the identity of law.3 In this respect he is especially influenced by Kant’s 
preoccupation with moral law as a conditional or categorical imperative or 
form (Derrida 1987: 32; 1990: 245, 275; 1992: 191). Conditional and the 
categorical imperatives intellectually transcend experience. Imperatives 
are universals because they are purged of social-cultural content. This is so 
because difference arises from the differentiation of the boundary of one 
form from the boundary of another. This preoccupation with the bound-
ary of forms is reinforced by our own association of laws with doctrines, 
rules, principles, tests, and other forms. The consequence is that the inter-
relation of forms defers to a sameness. A form is important because of its 
utilitarian relation to another form. A form is stuck in acts of intellectuali-
zation. The differences are homogenous.
 Put another way, what might be considered ‘difference’ is a difference 
among signified forms in a given disciplinary language. Hegel describes 
such differentiation as Verstand.4 Although one might literally translate Ver-
stand as ‘understanding’, Verstand misses the embodiment of meaning. 
Gadamer (as did Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) associates understanding 
with such meaning. Objects can be meant as well as perceived. Meant 
objects draw from the experiential body so that understanding is lived. 
Understanding thereby defers to the prejudicia or prejudgements and for-
estructures of the experiential body. Verstand lacks such an inquiry into 
such prejudgements and forestructures of meaning because Verstand lifts 
Gadamer’s ‘understanding’ above lived experiences by distinguishing 
between the boundaries of signified (and empty) forms. Since law, for 
Derrida, is composed of signified forms, the justice of legal space – the 
justice being concrete or immediate (or present) acts of meaning – is inac-
cessible to such forms. Legal space is highly reified vis-à-vis the ipseity of 
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Derrida’s territorial knowledge of justice  109
decisions – that is, reified as configurations of signifiers. Signifiers can be 
intellectually used by officials without ever having to address the experien-
tial content of forms. So too, the intellectual differentiations of forms miss 
the immersion of the officials and of the forms in the prejudicia of a shared 
ethos.5
 The consequence of this sense of a system of laws (lois) as forms is that 
the forms are content independent. If the forms represent social relations 
as they are or as they ought to be, this is a mere happenstance. And yet the 
forms are said to be universally applied to all social relationships that fall 
inside the boundary of the forms. Inhabitants, as subjects, fall ‘under’ and 
‘before’ the forms. They are ‘equal’ under and before the boundary within 
which the familiar knowledge of forms exists. Because the forms are 
content independent, the forms possess some surpassing reductive ability to 
contain responsiveness, to ensure that ‘the aleatory margin . . . remains 
homogenous with calculation, within the order of the calculable’ (Derrida 1989: 
55, quoted in Fitzpatrick 2005: 4, emphasis added). The forms, as univer-
sals, assimilate all threatening forms ‘out there’ beyond their boundaries.
 All language is thereby written in the sense of being signifying relations 
– that is, in the sense that signifiers represent signified forms in terms of 
other signifiers without ever accessing the forms (see further Conklin 
1996). Language, in this context, is thereby public rather than privately 
thought out inside one’s intentional consciousness. Derrida takes Edmund 
Husserl’s theory of meaning to represent a theory of language as private. 
Husserl (2001: esp. 560–2) claims that a subject may be present or imme-
diate with intended or meant objects. Derrida claims that such an immedi-
acy occurs through speech. Speech itself, however, is nested in the 
configurations of signifiers, according to Derrida. For Derrida, concepts 
just do not exist independent of chains of signifiers – that is, of writing. 
One signifier defers to another signifier, not to the signified forms (see 
especially Derrida 1974). Indeed, we can never access universals except as 
signifiers. We are entrapped in the prison-house of language or, as Derrida 
put it, of differance. Joining this early focus of signification to his later works 
on law, universals (lois) are the never-ending configurations of signifiers 
(or names). Signifiers re-present universals (which we associate with doc-
trines and rules). We believe that laws are forms but we can never access 
the forms through language – at least, as Derrida understands language as 
configurations of signifiers. The inaccessibility of the forms signified by 
configurations of signifiers leads us to conclude, according to Derrida, 
that law (droit) can never be ‘presently [and] fully just’ (1990: 253, as quoted 
in Fitzpatrick 2005: 4). Presence, after all, returns us to Husserl’s or 
embodied experiential language, something which is not possible, Derrida 
had claimed in his earlier works. As Fitzpatrick emphasizes, the system of 
forms (droit), to be universal (i.e. as forms), ‘cannot be contained in its 
determinate presence’ (ibid.: 6).
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 The consequence for Derrida’s own understanding of laws with univer-
sal forms is that the forms are nested inside chains of signifiers, not in the 
constitution of meaning by bodily experiences. Power relations, as a result, 
determine who is recognized as a legal person. The ‘private domain’ of 
the foreigner is recognized as a legal person by the act of officials ‘choos-
ing, electing, filtering, selecting their invitees, visitors, or guests, those to 
whom they [officials of the state] decide to grant asylum, the right of visit-
ing, or hospitality’ (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 55). As Fitzpatrick 
quotes affirmatively from Derrida, law is ‘a system of regulated and coded 
prescriptions’ (Derrida 1990: 250, quoted in Fitzpatrick 2005: 4). And 
again, law is understood as an ‘existing, coded rule’ that ‘can . . . guarantee 
absolutely’ the ultimate decision by a judge or other official’ (Derrida 
1990: 251, quoted in Fitzpatrick 2005: 4). The boundaries of forms are 
‘coded’ by configurations of signifiers. So, legal analysis, in its effort to 
access legal objectivity, differentiates one signifier in terms of another sig-
nifier. The problem is that the discrete laws are never determinate in 
human experience, at least as long as we assume that laws are content-
independent forms. As Derrida (1973: 129–60) emphasizes, the signifier 
represents a universal (i.e. a form or concept), which in turn is always 
deferred from being accessed. So, the indeterminacy of forms arises from 
the never-ending trace of one signifier to another. The re-reading of signi-
fiers never accesses the signified forms nor the individual context-specific 
experiences of meaning-constituting subjects.
 This deferring of an immediacy or presence (or embodiment of 
meaning) to doctrines, rules, tests, and other forms is especially apparent 
when one re-reads Derrida’s reading of Kafka’s parable of ‘the man from 
the country’. A castle represents or signifies the Law as a system of forms. 
The castle does have a door to the exteriority. A sentry, representing the 
legal official, stands on guard at the door. The guard gazes outward towards 
the man from the country. The man from the country waits and waits in 
order to access the Castle through the door. If officials deeper in the Castle 
decided to admit the man from the country, such a decision would be deter-
minate. Until that moment, the Castle merely represents universals about 
rights and duties. Because the universals make claims without ever being 
opened for the man to enter into them, the Law remains indeterminate. 
The lived experiences of the man are excluded from the Law. The social 
relations that the man has experienced prior to his lifetime waiting before 
the Castle represents how the excluded man and his excluded lived experi-
ences were ‘before’ the Law. They are phenomenologically and analytically 
before the law. The justice with which we legal officials are familiar – the 
justice of legal forms – is misdirected because justice rests in the experiential 
world that Kafka so powerfully describes of K. The universals, which the 
Castle represents, are inaccessible from the experiential world because an 
untranslatable rupture is believed to separate the language of the man from 
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the country from the language of the guards of the Castle of Law. The lan-
guage of the Castle cannot be just:
To address oneself to the other in the language of the other is both 
the condition of all possible justice, it seems, but, in all rigor, it 
appears not only impossible (since I cannot speak the language of the 
other except to the extent that I appropriate it and assimilate it 
according to the law [loi] of an implicit third) but even excluded by 
justice as law, inasmuch as justice as law seems to imply an element of 
universality; the appeal to a third party who suspends the unilaterality 
or singularity of the idioms.
(Derrida 1990: 245)
Since justice, according to Derrida, dwells in what Husserl describes as 
lived or experiential meaning, and because such meaning is excluded 
from writing, justice remains untranslated and untranslatable by the Cas-
tle’s officials. This is the secret of the Law. This secret is ‘an extremely 
painful thing’ (Kafka 1988: 437, as quoted in Fitzpatrick 2005: 13).
 Fitzpatrick exemplifies this painful consequence of law with reference 
to the civilizing mission of the colonialist on the one hand and the indi-
genous experiences of the aboriginal peoples in North America and Aus-
tralia on the other. So long as we remain in the illusion that the system 
(droit) of laws (lois) has a foundation, we will pursue the colonizing 
project. Fitzpatrick brilliantly exposes how Chief Justice Lamer of the 
Canadian Supreme Court defined aboriginality in a way that aboriginal 
rights could not be defined except within the Enlightenment (i.e. 
Kantian) philosophical precepts of ‘general and universal’ (R. v. van der 
Peet [1996] 2 Supreme Court Reports 507, paras 17–19). And Fitzpatrick 
(2002) explains how the Australian High Court held the concept of terra 
nullius invalid only by the Court’s refusal to challenge the concept of colo-
nial acquisition. By inference, indigenous rights are not rights unless they 
are guided by the universal sameness inside the form(al) legal language of 
the Europeanized state. Rights are thereby distinguished from each other 
without addressing the social relations presupposed in the content of the 
rights as forms. But it is not surprising that Derrida would consider the 
law, as Recht, to be indeterminate. By associating laws (lois) with empty 
forms, Derrida finds it easy to represent justice as the unrepresentable and 
unsignifiable immediacy of utterer with intended objects, an immediacy 
that Derrida associates with a decision.
Individuality
Given that laws are understood as forms (or universals), we have to ask, 
‘What is the exteriority to the system of forms?’ Derrida uses the terms 
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ipseity and ‘individuality’ to describe the exteriority to the forms. What 
does he signify by individuality?
 One might respond to this question by returning to the embodiment of 
meaning by the subject. We have seen, however, that in Derrida’s theory 
of language, all there is is writing, and, as such, there is no subject except 
as constructed from the configurations of signs. The being is recognized 
as a legal person with rights and duties. The being is given a place with a 
name (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 35). That said, Derrida not 
infrequently describes the exteriority to law as a heterology of experienced 
events. Such events crystallize as a decision. There is no doubt, that is, that, 
in contrast to his early work (Speech and Phenomena and Of Grammatology), 
Derrida in later writings recognizes that the experiential meanings do exist, 
but his legal theory claims that they are excluded from the chains of signi-
fiers which represent forms. Indeed, Derrida describes such experienced 
meanings as justice. Fitzpatrick too associates individuality or ipseity with 
‘the determinate presence’ or immediacy upon which ‘the universals are 
dependent’ (2005: 4). The experiential meanings become an object of 
consciousness in a decision. These intended objects render the forms 
determinate. That is, the forms gain content. Yet the presence or immedi-
acy of author with a decision is only a moment in experiential time. As 
such, it cannot be signified as a universal inside the border of Recht – so 
long as we understand Recht as empty universals or forms.
 With this in mind, this may be what the guard of the doorway to the 
Castle of law meant when he ended the parable with the explanation 
that the doorway is only for the man from the country and no one else. 
If the man had been called to enter a doorway, some individual official 
would have had to make a determinate decision (Derrida and Dufourm-
antelle 2000: 61). The possibility arises that law would be other than 
form at that moment of decision (Fitzpatrick 2005: 6). The decision 
would determine the particular content of the form. Meaning-constituting 
acts of experiential knowledge would give body to such a determinacy. 
The determinate decision is lived. A decision about the forms depends 
upon this experiential event for its content. This being so, law – as a 
system of forms – needs to respond to the experienced exteriority in order 
to have determinacy. The experiential meanings of the man from the 
country incorporate that determinacy. Without the response of codified 
forms to the context-specific experienced event, we are left with a self-
generating and self-defining system of signifiers which construct the 
deific state and then claim legitimacy by tracing the signifiers to the state 
as an empty form.
 This is the point where Fitzpatrick departs from Derrida. If officials, like 
the guard of the Castle, can never cross the boundary of the system of 
forms, the determinate legal decision is an unaccessed remainder to the 
system of laws as forms. For Fitzpatrick, the remainder is constituted from 
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the individuality of a decision. The individuality, being a determinate 
decision, concerns a social being-with others (Fitzpatrick 2005: 14–15). It 
involves being because the exterior pre-legality is unreified by the chains of 
legal signs. It involves being with, because the beings only exist with other 
strangers to the chains of signs. It seems that Fitzpatrick leaves this social 
relationship as a ‘given’ in his argument. He is thereby able to locate social 
relationships in the very justice that is experienced before the content- 
independent forms are analysed (that is, decomposed). But because the 
forms are so dependent upon the pre-legal social relationships that law 
craves to enclose in determinate decisions – if only for a fleeting experi-
enced moment – law must respond to unreified social relationships, 
according to Fitzpatrick. This is difficult for Derrida, because Derrida pre-
supposes a territorial-like boundary that excludes the individuality of a 
decision (or intuition) as a remainder to laws as a system of forms. Such a 
boundary stands in the way of Law and of its discrete laws becoming Good. 
The Good, as a remainder, thereby exceeds the Law and laws (Derrida 
1990: 257, quoted in Fitzpatrick 2005: 4).
The territorial sense of legal knowledge
I now wish to ask why it is that violence is considered part and parcel of 
Derrida’s theory of law as a structure of forms. I wish to do so by claiming 
that the self-defining and self-sustaining system of forms presupposes a 
special sense of legal knowledge.
 Legal knowledge (about lois) and knowledge about law (as droit) pre-
suppose a territorial-like boundary that separates familiar concepts from 
an unrecognizable chaos. This territorial knowledge is presupposed about 
the analysis of laws as empty forms. Such knowledge is ironically pre- 
conceptual. It is a priori, or prior to the positivity of concepts, facts, and 
values. The territorial knowledge assumes a special sense of space and of 
time. Territorial (as opposed to experiential) space exists as the enclosure 
of a wild territory by a border. A physical thing exists if it can be located 
and measured inside the boundary of the space. A thing can be located by 
objective standards of longitude and latitude. The thing can be measured 
by a land survey. The thing can be perceived as a physical-chemical mass 
in territorial space. Even the actions of a human being can be perceived as 
if locatable on a measurable space within the boundary.
 Now, it is a short step from such a sense of space as territorial or phys-
ical to a likened knowledge as possessing a territorial-like character. A ter-
ritorial boundary demarcates an inside and from an outside. As Derrida 
describes the territorial-like knowledge, which pre-censors the foreigner, 
‘what is at issue . . . is once again the trace of a frontier between the public 
and the non-public, between public or political space and individual or 
familial home’ (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 49–51). The foreigner 
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on the other side of the frontier of legal knowledge is neither a subject 
nor an object. Derrida describes this aporia in this manner:
What is a foreigner? What would a foreign woman be?
 It is not only the man or woman who keeps abroad of the outside of 
society, the family, the city. It is not the other, the completely other 
who is relegated to an absolute outside, savage, barbaric, precultural, 
and prejuridical, outside and prior to the family, the community, the 
city, the nation, or the State. The relationship to the foreigner is regu-
lated by law, by the becoming-law of justice. This step would take us 
back to Greece, close to Oedipus and Socrates, if it wasn’t already too 
late.
(ibid.: 73)
The frontier of legal knowledge dwells in a twilight between the familiar 
forms inside the boundary of territorial knowledge and the chaos that 
remains unrecognized beyond the boundary. Subjectivity is believed to be 
situated in such a chaos. Law must be and remains objective so long as 
officials analyse the boundaries of forms.
 Permit me to suggest several contexts where the common law presup-
poses territorial knowledge. First, constitutional law is preoccupied with 
the study of the boundary of legal knowledge. So too, federalism law has 
accepted territorial knowledge as the key to constitutionality. When consti-
tutional bills of rights address whether to recognize the foreigner, the bills 
of rights presuppose just such a boundary between the language of rights 
on the one hand and pre-conceptual experiential knowledge on the other. 
If legal officials picture the being as outside the boundary of constitutional 
rights, the being remains nameless and her or his or its voice silent.
 Second, territorial knowledge is also manifested in the radical title of 
the state to territory. Property is private to the state because, as a legal 
claim, the form of property represents all territory which is possessed and 
controlled within a territorial boundary. So too, private property is recog-
nized as legal knowledge because the property is believed to possess a ter-
ritorial-like boundary, which mirrors the territorial boundary that 
physically demarcates myself from yourself. Third, even custom is juridi-
fied if it can be pinpointed as located on a territorial space and on the cal-
endar date. If so pinpointed, custom is existent with a name (signifier). 
Both the custom and the culture with which it is identified must have a 
recognizable name. Interestingly, indigenous cultures began to take on 
names and on the distinct recognition of a ‘tribe’ after the Europeans 
pressed North American inhabitants further and further west, at least to 
the Rocky Mountains (Albers 1996: 90–118). Territorial knowledge recog-
nizes the identity of beings. As Anne Dufourmantelle writes, ‘[T]his geo-
graphy leads throughout the seminar to the revelation of the question 
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‘Where?’ as being the question of man’ (Derrida and Dufourmantelle 
2000: 52). The point that needs emphasis is that time only begins when 
the claim to knowledge inside a territorial boundary is established and 
space only exists as a legal condition once there is such a claim to territo-
rial knowledge. Without such a boundary it is difficult for a legal official to 
speak of knowing the stranger.
 The consequence of this territorial sense of time and space is that one 
knows something if that thing has a name which is recognized inside the 
‘known’ boundary of knowledge. Knowledge is territorial. Officials recog-
nize concepts, including the rule (i.e. concept) of recognition, from inside 
the territorial-like boundary of knowledge. The official’s or philosopher’s 
personal opinion about the content of a concept matters little. Such a per-
sonal opinion is something external to the boundary of knowledge. What 
matters is whether a form is recognizable inside the territorial-like bound-
ary of knowledge. A concept itself is also territorial-like intra vires or ultra 
vires. And yet the boundary, being humanly constructed, presupposes a 
rupture or gap between the inside of legal knowledge and outside the wall. 
Territorial knowledge is prior to the possibility of the vacuous foundation 
(droit) of the system of forms (lois) as a whole.
 There is another consequence of the territorial sense of knowledge. If a 
being inhabits a territory on the other side of territorial space, that being 
is a foreigner, a stranger, an alien (Conklin 2006a). The being is unrecog-
nized and unrecognizable as a legal person with rights and duties. The 
being is undefined by statutory or common law rights and duties. Territo-
rial knowledge needs this unrecognizable foreigner in order to maintain 
the boundary and frontier of legal knowledge. For there to be an inside 
and an outside, an intra vires and ultra vires, legal persons and aliens, cit-
izens and non-citizens, familiar rules and unfamiliar rules, law and justice 
– for there to be such dichotomies, there has to be a territorial-like bound-
ary that severs the inside from the outside. This boundary is so steadfast in 
our thinking that Derrida describes it and accepts it as ‘the law of the law’ 
(Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 65). Derrida ironically seems to 
accept the boundary as an uncontrollable law – as a natural law, that is.
 These two consequences of territorial knowledge are most obviously 
highlighted in the doctrine of terra nullius or ‘vacant land’, for example. 
When the Europeans began to settle in Australia, New Zealand, North and 
South America, and Africa, they brought with them this territorial-like 
sense of knowledge. Concepts such as the concepts of territorial control 
and entitlement to property required a fixity in a structure of knowledge. 
Since the indigenous societies were predominantly nomadic to the west of 
present-day south-western Ontario and James Bay and east of the Rockies 
(Albers 1996: 116), it is difficult to invariably describe an indigenous sense 
of territoriality as associated with a geographical fixity on land. Exclusivity, 
let alone title to property, hardly characterizes the sense of knowledge of 
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nomadic groups. And yet, without a sense of the fixed and exclusive pos-
session of territory it is difficult to understand how indigenous nomadic 
societies possessed private property, individual rights, and autonomous 
nations. Along similar lines, if the indigenous community lacked a semb-
lance of a centrally organized government whose single leader the Euro-
pean military officials could identify with as an equal, treaties with such a 
community tended to lack a binding character upon the European party 
to the treaty. Such a territorial view of legal knowledge confers title to ter-
ritory. The state owns ‘ultimate title’ or ‘underlying title’, as property, of 
all territory that it possesses and symbolically controls. States even extend 
this knowledge claim, of recent days, to the territorial space of the Arctic 
Ocean and the moon. The entitlement to the territory includes all 
resources, land, plants, and animals on, under, and above the territory. 
The best that strangers, unrecognized inside the territorial-like structure 
of forms, can claim is an ‘inchoate’ usufructory right to property. Interest-
ingly, the usufructory right is a term adopted by Roman lawyers to describe 
the rights of slaves to possess, but not own, things.6
 If space can only exist if there is a boundary surrounding a territory, 
and if indigenous societies did not share such a sense of space or institu-
tionalize their life-worlds in terms of territorial knowledge, the European 
states could consider the settled lands as terra nullius or vacant even 
though many millions inhabited the territory prior to the transmission of 
disease and killing by Europeans. With the belief that legal knowledge was 
constrained by territorial-like boundaries, legal reasoning could even gen-
erate what the foreigners looked like as ‘social fact’. Legal reasoning could 
also generate the foundation of the territorial knowledge. This construc-
tion of foreigner and of foundation could be maintained as objective fact 
and as consistent with the rule of law because officials only claimed know-
ledge within the territorial-like boundary. The boundary of territorial 
knowledge required that officials imagine the foreigner and the founda-
tion as the inversion of their self-image as officials in a legal order. This 
inversion underlies Fitzpatrick’s comment that civilization imagined itself 
as ‘the kind of society which no longer recognizes any alternative to itself’ 
(2004: 122, quoting Bauman 2001: 99). The consequence is that violence 
threatens a legal order from within legal language, not from without (Fitz-
patrick 2001a: 292). The rule by laws unknowingly disguises violence 
against the pre-conceptual experiential knowledge as well as against the 
strangers whom the laws will not recognize with a name. Valid laws are 
intra the vires. Invalid laws are ultra vires.
 This territorial-like knowledge impacts upon contemporary legal reason-
ing. Like the Law (droit) as a whole, each discrete form has a boundary 
within which the form has a universal scope. The unknowable is pre- 
conceptual. What extends beyond the form’s boundary is the unknowable 
world. Each discipline has its own territorial-like boundary. Legal reasoning 
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excludes bodily intuitions, feelings, attitudes, and other ‘subjectivist’ phe-
nomena as extra-legal, political or moral. Being outside legal knowledge, 
such extra-legal experiential phenomena are considered arbitrary and 
chaotic for the legal professional. Such non-legal factors in legal reasoning 
represent an absence of the possibility of law and of practical reason. We 
lack names for such a pre-conceptual world. More correctly, we do confer a 
name on the pre-conceptual world, and that is the name ‘power’. Power is 
juxtaposed with law; the pre-conceptual pre-legal world on the other side 
of the threshold of knowledge is juxtaposed with the acts of intellectualiza-
tion inside the threshold. We officials must protect the possibility of a pre-
legal world. It is our secret: this has been the social function of the 
professional North American law school. Officials can, at best, attempt to 
escape from the prison-house of language by picturing the unreified world 
on the other side of the frontier by a metaphor. Professional knowers of 
the familiar signifying relations take the standpoint of the knowable struc-
ture, not of the heterology of the voices of strangers on the other side of 
the border, when picturing the unreified world. The heterologous voices of 
the stranger, as Derrida (and Merleau-Ponty) emphasize, are silent 
(Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000: 25–35). The analysis of forms as laws 
forgets the language of the foreigner on the other side of the rupture 
between the familiar and the unknowable, in advance. This pre-censorship 
of the heterology of voices, as Hart hints in his legal theory and in his 
private life, causes an ‘indefinable anxiety’ (Hart 1994: 87; Lacey 2004: 26). 
The silent voice of the stranger exterior to the threshold of territorial 
knowledge is ‘that terrible thing which opens language to its own beyond’ 
(Derrida 1985: 76).
 And so, to take one example, and only as an example, international law 
presupposes territorial knowledge as a legal space that pre-exists the lawyer 
and legal critic. The boundary that makes this space possible legitimates 
the space as well as the rules, doctrines, and other forms, such as the state, 
which are locatable inside the boundary of legal space as knowable things. 
This territorial boundary of legal and moral knowledge remains mani-
fested in the international law doctrine of domaine réserve whereby the ter-
ritorial state alone has legitimacy to decide who is a citizen, who may enter 
its territorial borders, and whom it may expel from its borders. Unless cat-
egorized within the boundary of legal knowledge, a being is excluded 
from legal entitlement of certain rights and duties. One is an ‘alien’. This 
is even so in many judicial decisions if one is habitually resident in the ter-
ritory of the state for a long period of time. Indeed, the state officials 
enclose legal space within a structure of concepts such as the concept of 
property. This prior legitimizing territorial-like boundary was taken for 
granted in the early modern view of international law: international law 
existed, according to Fitzpatrick, ‘from an already-encompassing scheme 
of things within which the nations found their existence’ (2008a: 279). 
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This already-existing scheme was attributed to natural law, in the early 
modern period. Fitzpatrick (ibid.: 289) rightly quotes from Zygmunt 
Bauman (1989: 53) to describe the more recent colonial world as ‘fully 
and exhaustively divided into national domains . . . [with] no space left for 
internationalism’. This pre-existing division of the globe into legal spaces 
whose territorial-like boundaries set the limit to legal knowledge continues 
to the present day. Territorial knowledge prevents any transcendent com-
monality between the inside and the exteriority. Boundaries have sepa-
rated legal persons (and therefore legal knowledge) throughout the 
globe. The boundaries render legal knowledge possible. And human 
beings invariably fail to be recognized as legal persons inside and outside 
the territorial boundary of many states.
 Aside from the legal recognition of foreigners, territorial knowledge pro-
vides the background to our usual sense of freedom as negative. John Stuart 
Mill recognized this point in the context of his social philosophy as well as in 
his international legal theory. A boundary protected the territorial-like ‘inner 
sphere of life’ of an individual (Mill 1848/1970: 306). Inside the boundary 
the individual was free to choose and to act unless the individual caused 
harm by crossing the boundary of familiarity to the incomprehensible world 
of foreigners. At that point, one’s acts were ‘other-regarding’ and, therefore, 
open to social scrutiny of the harm caused to other beings (Mill 1859/1962: 
129). Mill (1984: 111–24) extended this image of territorial knowledge to the 
interrelations of the territorial state.
 My point for raising this example of territorial knowledge in interna-
tional law is to emphasize how territorial knowledge reinforces the dis-
guised violence of discrete forms as well as of the ultimate foundation of 
the forms. The universalist claim of the ultimate foundation of a secular 
legal order – the state – absorbed the universalism of the medieval Chris-
tendom (see especially Fitzpatrick 2006b). Legal philosophers from Bodin 
to Hart have acknowledged the need both to ground law in something 
external to knowable legal rules (the state of nature, the general will, the 
People, social facts) and, at the same time, to describe the system of rules 
as ‘autonomous, enclosed in itself, coherent in itself, and, in a sense above 
all, self-generating’ (Fitzpatrick 2009: 5).
 To this end, the rule of law (the rule by law) is an all-or-nothing matter: 
either self-contained forms or, alternatively, externalized unknowable 
chaos. In either case, power relations determine the outcome of disputes. 
Law is juxtaposed to power and power to law. If I am right that territorial 
knowledge is presupposed in the argument that the foundation of law 
(droit) and the forms (lois) of law are vacuous, then violence is part and 
parcel of the rule by laws – so long, that is, as we retain territoriality as the 
paradigm of knowledge.
 And so, the best that we can do within the boundary of territorial know-
ledge is to imagine the strangeness on the other side of the boundary of 
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familiar concepts. Knowledge of the stranger is a territorial knowledge. The 
stranger is pictured. And the picture offers a typified form rather than a 
crossing of the form’s boundary to the concrete experienced events of a 
concrete context-specific being, to the particularity of a decision by an offi-
cial her- or himself. This ontic character of legal reasoning about strangers 
is necessary once we accept that knowledge exists within a territorial-like 
boundary. Anything that does not come within the universal has to be 
‘utterly antithetical’ or of a ‘totally different existence’ (Fitzpatrick 2003c: 
11). One has to picture or imagine the totally different existence that the self-
defining law has failed to enclose. The picture re-presents the stranger in 
terms that are familiar to officials of the state. One cannot know the non-
form, this being the individuality of an experienced event by the stranger or 
even by the official. The interrelated system of forms, better known as 
primary and secondary rules, without a picture of the stranger outside the 
boundary of the system, cannot be known. One cannot know the stranger’s 
language except through our own configurations of signifier and form 
inside the make-believe wall of territorial knowledge. Nor can one know the 
rule of law, as a form, without picturing its opposite: rational chaos. Lawyers 
and judges have to imagine what it would be like without private property, 
the association of morality with legal rights, the juridification of lived experi-
ences, a secular state, and centralized institutions. Thus, the radical 
stranger, as antithetical to law, is an optic product because the officials ‘per-
ceive’ the stranger as inverted to their own self-image as professional 
knowers of forms. Early common law judgements and authorities (e.g. 
Blackstone, Adam Smith), contemporary judges (Brennan and Lamer), and 
legal philosophers (John Austin and Hart) share such an optic vision of the 
stranger. They are ‘undeveloped’ or ‘primitive’. So, given the theological 
origin of law in a secularized ideology and given the self-defined universal-
ism of a form, anything outside the boundary of the form has to be 
included. The universalist aspiration of the form is undermined if the exte-
rior is not included. What is not included within the boundary of knowledge 
remains alien to the system of forms. The outside offers a challenge for 
assimilation or conquest. The consequence is that laws are invariably violent 
against groups and individuals who do not share the content of the forms.
 The self-generating and self-regulative legal forms require that law must 
resist the very possibility of something or someone radically strange to the 
forms (see Fitzpatrick 2003a: 219–21; 2003b: 438–46; 2003c: 10–16; 2008a: 
181–6). Forms enclose everything, and yet can never fully enclose every-
thing. The remainder resists the forms. The latter remainder resists the 
forms. Fitzpatrick explains the necessary resistance as follows:
If it [law] were not coherent but contradictory, something else could 
resolve the contradiction. If it were not closed but open, then some-
thing else could enter and rule instead of or along with law. If it were 
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incomplete and not a whole corpus juris and thence necessarily related 
to something else, then that something else could share in the ruling 
with law. Finally, a law which in any of these situations is not going to 
be dependent upon something else must also be of self-originating 
and self-regulating.
(2003b: 432)
Accordingly, law must either resist or conquer the ‘utterly antithetical’ 
chaos and indeterminacy on the other side of law (Fitzpatrick 2003c: 11).7
 And so, here, we find a paradox. On the one hand, law must resist the 
radical strangeness of individuality in order to sustain its universality. On 
the other hand, law must respond to this radically antithetical strangeness 
for law to be determinate in content. In the absence of such a response 
there remains something unrecognized ‘out there’, far beyond the bound-
ary of the universal legal forms. But this remainder contradicts and under-
mines the very identity of law as empty forms. The radical strangeness to 
forms is, drawing from well-known Kafka’s parable, before the law – ‘before’ 
because particular experiences, such as K’s, are, as I read Kafka, unreified 
by the territorial knowledge of the decisions of professional knowers.
The territorial knowledge of justice
Now, once we entertain that forms attempt to assimilate yet forms need 
the exteriorized justice (as the heterology of meant or embodied objects) 
in order to be determinate, we must ask whether Derrida’s theory of law is 
well taken. In order to respond to this issue, let us gain a better idea of 
what is the justice that Derrida considers external to territorial knowledge. 
To this end, Fitzpatrick offers four contexts.
 First, the rule by law conceals the violence that the legal structure per-
petuates against infinite individualities that Derrida has associated with 
justice. Second, so long as professional knowers believe in the deific foun-
dation, the legal structure cannot possibly represent or manifest a social 
bonding (Fitzpatrick 2001c: 6; 2005: 14). After all, the legal structure is 
constituted from empty universals and the determinate decision is an indi-
viduated decision. There might be ‘Being with’, as Heidegger and Ben-Dor 
(Ben-Dor 2007) claim, but such a Being is inexpressible and inaccessible if 
we are limited to our ontic picture of the Being on the other side of the 
territorial boundary between law and the stranger. Such an idealized 
‘Being-with’, however, is hardly what Fitzpatrick has in mind when he uses 
the term ‘being with’ as the remainder of law. Third, forms, as universals, 
lack an incorporation of the pre-conceptual objects, which the third (the 
judge) means (in Husserl’s sense of meant objects in his Logical Investiga-
tions).8 This absence of meant objects also characterizes the languages of 
beings who lack legal recognition. Although the Greeks used the term 
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nomos to represent the drawing of a territorial boundary in the sand, nomos 
also represented the emotions and beliefs experienced by a group (Fitz-
patrick 2001c: 211–12, 221). In a fourth context, Kafka’s parable of the 
man from the country raises the prospect of the individuality of the one’s 
experiences and the inability of the guard to the castle of law to allow the 
man to enter the universals of law through the doorway especially made 
for him (see Derrida 1992: 191, discussed in Fitzpatrick 2005: 9). Further, 
as I have already observed of H. L. A. Hart (1994: 87), a dread overcomes 
the jurist and philosopher who faces the prospect that concepts do not 
control decisions (see also Lacey 2004). Today, philosophers describe this 
dread of individuality as idiosyncratic, subjective, arbitrary, and the like.
 Now, what is interesting is that for Derrida, justice is the very presence 
or immediacy, which in his earlier works he had argued was inaccessible to 
language (Derrida 1973). For Derrida, forms lack an immediate bonding 
or presence of the individual with the forms (see especially Fitzpatrick 
2005: 6). Yet Husserl had claimed that just such a bonding of utterer with 
signifiers characterizes acts of embodied meaning. The bonding is mani-
fested in an intuition. This intuition characterizes a decision. Because 
experience, expressed as meaning rather than as signification (the signifier/
signified relation), determines a decision, law, as signified forms, excludes 
the ‘distinctiveness’ of ‘the singularity of lived experience’ (Fitzpatrick 
2009). This excluded, yet necessary, determinacy ironically begs that we 
study the role of phenomenology in le droit as well as in des lois. We cannot 
know law without knowing the experiential pre-conceptual world that ter-
ritorial knowledge has excluded as unknowable. Fitzpatrick has a different 
name for this phenomenology: the ‘sociologic’ or ‘meta-ethics’ (2003b: 
444).9 Territorial knowledge has so far presupposed a rupture between the 
forms of territorial knowledge and the experiential meanings best mani-
fested in intuition or a decision. The question I raise is whether there is 
another sense of legal knowledge, one that does not require a leap from 
Verstand to phenomena or from phenomena to Verstand. After all, as von 
Uexküll urged, ‘the secret of the world is to be sought not behind objects 
[such as indeterminate forms], but behind subjects’ (1926: 29). Such 
 subjects embody determinate meant objects.
 My point bears repeating. As legal officials we tend to recognize the 
stranger by assimilating the stranger into the metaphysical boundaries of 
concepts, the concepts being rights, duties, and rules. This act of juridifi-
cation leaves the language of the stranger unassimilated. The sociability of 
the stranger remains uncodified. I have elaborated the complexity of this 
uncodified sociability elsewhere (Conklin 1998: 222–48).10 This social 
bonding is experienced as immediacy without the intervention of con-
cepts. A determinate decision cannot represent what is not enclosed 
within its concepts. Accordingly, sociability characterizes the presence of 
unreified beings that the coded rules, representing forms, do not and 
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cannot access inside the boundary of territorial knowledge. Legality 
depends upon this sociability because, contrary to the whole thrust of con-
temporary analytical jurisprudence that concepts can be and are reasons for 
action, ‘in law’ ‘ “no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee abso-
lutely” in advance [of] the outcome of any decision’ (Derrida 1990: 251, 
quoted in Fitzpatrick 2009: 17). That Derrida even acknowledges presence 
or immediacy as important for an understanding of law is interesting, given 
his claim that just such a presence lies at the core to the philosophy of meta-
physics. One needs to be mindful of Derrida’s critique of presence through-
out his works about language. The unrepresented presence of sociability is 
really ‘a law of originary sociability, prior to all determined law, qua natural 
law or positive law, but not prior to law in general’ (Derrida 1997: 231, 
quoted in Fitzpatrick 2005: 7, emphasis in original). The ‘law in general’, of 
course, is composed of the empty universals. Of course, once the founda-
tion is exposed as vacuous, we are left with the social belonging that is other 
than transcendent, content-independent forms. Derrida understands justice 
as otherwise than content-independent forms. Justice, for Derrida, is excised 
from the metaphysics of forms (Fitzpatrick 2005: 6).
 Fitzpatrick makes an analytic argument as to why law must respond to 
justice in Derrida’s sense of justice. First, Fitzpatrick restates Nancy’s point 
that an excluded singularity cannot be with another singularity without the 
pre-existence of both the included and excluded singularities. An ontological 
community thereby exists in a far deeper sense than ‘man as a social being’ 
(Nancy 1991: 28).11 Next, Fitzpatrick draws from Davidson, who explains that 
different entities can only be distinct and yet have a relation with each other 
‘if there is a common coordinate system on which to plot them’ (Davidson 
1985: 130, quoted in Fitzpatrick 2008a: 289). Fitzpatrick reverses this idea by 
suggesting that if different entities are things-in-themselves and yet are being-
with each other, then the only commonality possible is external to same-
ness. Thus, a community ‘as a continuate being-with cannot be contained 
within any existent realization of it . . . it must ever extend receptively 
beyond present existence, otherwise it will not be able to continue “in 
being” ’ (ibid.: 289). So, law forever responds to the excluded ‘being-with’ 
that remains unrealized in empty universals at any one determinate 
moment. A law, considered an empty form, depends upon what is 
excluded from it for its determinate content. For example, both the uni-
versal and general laws of the colonial states and the universal ius gentium 
of international law are empty of content by virtue of their claim to univer-
sality. And yet they are dependent upon the absent infinite individualities 
of aboriginal peoples and of the particular ethe of nations for their content. 
This being so, ‘this vertiginous alternation’ between the (posited formal) 
law on the one hand and then its determinate response to the ‘existently 
singular’ of ‘being-with’ on the other is the ‘pointed place for [justice as] 
access’ (Fitzpatrick 2005: 14).
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 This argument holds only so long as we share Derrida’s sense of laws as 
empty forms, however. Given the universal as a metaphysical construct, 
given the emptiness of such a universal, and given that the universal is sig-
nified in writing, these three conditions necessitate that singularity be 
excluded upon the positing of the legal decision. Justice is thereby derived 
from the exteriority on the other side of the territorial-like boundary of 
law. But such formalist law presupposes the territorial sense of knowledge. 
What is recognized as a universal is signified inside the territorial boundary 
of the familiar. The walled construction is signified in writing vis-à-vis 
speech. Such a view of legal knowledge reinforces the territorial sense of 
law and, accordingly, of justice. What remains unrecognized is excluded as 
non-law. The experiential body of the third is also excluded. But if lived 
experiences remain untouched by legal forms, does not this raise the need 
to reconsider the identity of laws as discrete, content-independent univer-
sals? Is not experiential knowledge important in understanding ‘what is a 
determinate law’? And if this is so, is there some sense of law otherwise 
than universal forms?
 Regrettably, space (territorial space) prevents me from elaborating a 
theory of law as social content (see Conklin 2008). Derrida, it bears 
reminding, relies heavily upon Kant’s moral and legal works for Derrida’s 
own understanding of the identity of law. For Kant, again, a universal tran-
scends social phenomena by virtue of its emptiness of social-cultural 
content. A universal, however, is a norm whose content is shared in an 
ethos. The function of the decision-maker is to identify the presupposed 
reciprocal social relations in the content of a form and then to address 
whether those reciprocal relations are coherent with the said relations in 
the ethos of which formal laws are only one element (see Conklin 2008: 
83–112, 156–87). Hegel argues, rightly, that the critical issue is not ‘what is 
law?’ but ‘what identified form is legitimate?’ A determinate decision does 
not exist as a legally binding decision unless the meant, as opposed to sig-
nified, objects of its content manifests a reciprocal recognition of beings. 
This view of the legitimacy of law undermines Derrida’s legal formalism. 
More, this view of the legitimacy of Law and of laws explains on my terms 
(rather than Fitzpatrick’s) why Law and laws must respond to justice as 
Derrida (and Fitzpatrick) understand justice.
 Discrete determinate decisions (including Derrida’s concern for deter-
minacy in a decision) cannot exist without such a determinate decision 
being legitimate. And the legitimacy of a law, in turn, depends upon the 
reciprocal recognition of individuals as presupposed in the content of a 
discrete form. Laws do not exist, that is, without the very content that Kant 
excludes from the universal form of das Recht and that Derrida believes 
only arrives on the scene in the decidability of an official’s reasoning about 
empty forms. If Hegel’s understanding of discrete laws is compelling, then 
the antithetical chaos, savagery, and feminine – the locus of experiential 
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time and space – is not dependent upon the universal form of the founda-
tion such as the state or humanism. Rather, determinate laws are nested in 
the experiential and shared meanings of a pre-legality. This pre-legality 
has heretofore been excluded from ‘the law’ and from the study of law in 
the analytic tradition. This is so both analytically and phenomenologically 
before universal forms are ever posited as the starting point of the philo-
sophy about the nature of law. Accordingly, the secret of determinate laws 
lies in the subject’s constitution and fulfilment of meanings. The exposure 
of such a secret, though, begs that one inquire into the legitimacy of uni-
versals. If inquiry proceeds behind such forms to the subject’s constitution 
and fulfilment of embodied meaning, it may be that such meaning pro-
vides the determinacy that has heretofore been excluded from law.
 Once we reconsider Derrida’s understanding of law and of laws as 
empty forms, a whole series of issues is begged. Most importantly, ‘does 
the judge as “the third” address justice, as lived experiences, when the 
third makes a determinate decision?’ And if so, ‘are determinate decisions 
rendered with reference to standards that are not posited but rather are 
constituted from the intentional acts of the third (that is, of the lived acts 
of meaning according to Husserl)?’ A phenomenology of the pre-legal 
world undermines Derrida’s theory of law. As a consequence, the phenom-
enology of the pre-legal world is the call for justice.
 The contemporary professional knower of ‘legal’ signs has been satis-
fied with the positing of social facts or with the justification of forms 
nested in posited beliefs and values. Until the rich writings of Fitzpatrick 
are recognized, jurists and philosophers will continue to bury their heads 
in the sand and to close their eyes as if blind to the vacuity of the founda-
tion of a legal structure. The problem is especially critical because of the 
risk that we forget that we have even forgotten the vacuity of the founda-
tion of a modern legal order and thereby the excision of the pre-legality 
from legal recognition. If one forgets an experience, one can remember it 
(sometimes with the aid of a therapist). But if one forgets that one ever 
forgot the experience, one can never remember it. We have claimed to be 
lawyers and legal philosophers who know how to imagine the outside but 
we do not know what we have been talking about. We have been content 
with the decomposition of concepts as signified by the analytic methodol-
ogy. And yet, ‘There is still here a primary assertion of the bounded to 
which a ranging beyond remains tethered. There has to be yet more. 
Nomos cannot be positioned only in the bounded but must somehow 
extend intrinsically to an “outside” ’ (Fitzpatrick 2001c: 221). The outside 
is inside – that is, the officials and philosophers of the state themselves 
posit who is outside, a foreigner, to a legal order, and the outside is 
derived from the inside of territorial knowledge.
 A phenomenology of the pre-legal world has been introduced else-
where (Conklin 1998, 2006a, b, 2008). What I need to emphasize at this 
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point is that experiential knowledge raises the prospect that the identity of 
law radically differs from the empty forms with which Derrida derives his 
understanding of laws. For just as lived meanings embody the stranger’s, 
as K’s, individuality upon which legal forms depend, so too the profes-
sional knower incorporates meant or experienced objects that determine 
one’s decisions. Such meant objects radically differ from the posited deter-
minate standards that officials and legal philosophers have heretofore 
taken for granted as objectivity. Such determinate standards are meant. 
And meant objects are shared in the collective memories of an ethos. 
Meant objects are not the same as perceived or posited objects. Meant 
objects are concealed inside the forms that Derrida takes for granted as 
the essence of law. Such meant objects draw from bodily experiences 
rather than from the objectivity of the signifier/form relations with which 
Derrida identifies le droit and les lois.
 The issue is whether embodied meanings in an ethos play a role in the 
identity of law and of laws. Are the objects of experiential knowledge 
shared in such a deep and self-conscious way that one can speak about 
social bonding and a social ethos as integral parts of laws? And if a form’s 
content is determinate – that is, if the phenomenology of meaning consti-
tutes determinate forms – does sociability still dwell exterior to the law? 
Justice is access, just as Fitzpatrick claimed. But the access is directed 
towards the intentional acts of the official, just as access also addresses the 
intentional acts of non-officials. Shared intentional meanings constitute 
the social bonding that legitimizes the content of determinate decisions. 
Derrida’s sense of law sets out such bonding as somehow another law that 
differs from the Kantian empty universals. But such formalism is hardly 
recognizable as a system of laws precisely because forms are not legal units 
if their content lacks legitimacy and if legitimacy addresses the reciprocal 
relations of individuals in an ethos presupposed by the content of a form’s 
boundaries. Territorial knowledge fails to address such a possibility 
because territorial knowledge posits a boundary between the inside and 
outside, formalism and social-cultural ethos, universal and individuality, 
law and justice. Without an inquiry into the content of the inside – of the 
forms and universals – the territorial-like boundary misdirects what is law 
and, therefore, of law’s call for justice.
Notes
 1 I explain this point in more detail in Conklin (2001: 37–55).
 2 See, for example, Kramer (2007: 16, 75) and Leiter (2007: 55, 101, 133, 258). 
For Hart’s view, see Hart (1977: 969). According to Hart, the pre-legal experi-
ence of social bonding ‘haunts much legal thought’ (1994: 87) as if it were ‘a 
chain binding those who have obligations so that they are not free to do what 
they want’. Hart acknowledged that pre-theoretical differences might well have 
explained why Hart and Fuller saw the world so differently: ‘I am haunted by 
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the fear that our starting-points and interests in jurisprudence are so different 
that the author and I are fated never to understand each other’s work’ (1983: 
343). Nicola Lacey (2004) describes how Hart dreaded the intervention of 
experience into rationality in his day-to-day life.
 3 On this point, see, for example, Derrida (1990: 233, 245, 254, 275; 1992: 191, 
194; 1994: 28, 190; 2002: 3–18) and Derrida and Dufourmantelle (2000: 69–73, 
147–51). Fitzpatrick incorporates the problematic as Kant’s in many of his writ-
ings (see, for example, Fitzpatrick 2005: 11).
 4 This notion is generally explained in Conklin (2008: 95–9).
 5 This is explained in more detail in Conklin (2008: 99–112, 162–87).
 6 Although the slave could use the peculium as a source of capital income and, 
over time, could amass sufficient funds, the slave could not own property (see 
Borkowski and du Plessis 2005: 96–7).
 7 Here, the resistance is not to law nor against law but of law. Modern law must 
resist its antithetical alien, the experience of individuality.
 8 A meant object is generated from the act of meaning of the individual’s experi-
ential body. This contrasts with an object that is posited by a source external to 
such an act of meaning. Edmund Husserl explains this distinction in his Logical 
Investigations (1970), and the distinction is elaborated in Conklin (1998: 30, 
103, 207).
 9 The possibility of understanding law as such ethicality in the content of legal 
forms is addressed in further detail in Conklin (2008: 169–87).
10 This sociability arises because an individual, by her- or himself, does not exist 
unless she or he relates to other beings, according to Fitzpatrick (2006b: 82).
11 Fitzpatrick cites Nancy’s analysis on several occasions.
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